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In the past, financial stock markets have been studied with previous generations of multi-agent
systems (MAS) that relied on zero-intelligence agents, and often the necessity to implement so-called
noise traders to sub-optimally emulate price formation processes. However recent advances in the
fields of neuroscience and machine learning have overall brought the possibility for new tools to
the bottom-up statistical inference of complex systems. Most importantly, such tools allows for
studying new fields, such as agent learning, which in finance is central to information and stock
price estimation. We present here the results of a new generation MAS stock market simulator,
where each agent autonomously learns to do price forecasting and stock trading via model-free
reinforcement learning, and where the collective behaviour of all agents decisions to trade feed a
centralised double-auction limit order book, emulating price and volume microstructures. We study
here what such agents learn in detail, and how heterogenous are the policies they develop over time.
We also show how the agents learning rates, and their propensity to be chartist or fundamentalist
impacts the overall market stability and agent individual performance. We conclude with a study
on the impact of agent information via random trading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Background : Multi-agent systems (MAS) or agent-
based models (ABM) have had a long history of statisti-
cal inference in quantitative finance research. In partic-
ular, they have been used to study phenomena leading
to price formation and hence general market microstruc-
ture, such as: the law of supply and demand [1], game
theory [2], order books [3], high-frequency trading [4, 5],
cross-market structure [6], quantitative easing [7], market
regulatory impact [8], or other exogenous effects [9]. Re-
markably, financial MAS have highlighted over the years
certain specific patterns that are proper to virtually al-
most all asset classes and time scales, called stylised facts.
These have since been an active topic of quantitative re-
search [10, 11], and can be grouped in three main neigh-
bouring categories: i- distributions of price returns are
non-gaussian [12–14] (they are asymmetric, negatively
skewed, and platykurtic), ii- volatilities and volumes are
clustered [10] (large jumps in prices and volumes are
more likely to be followed by the same), iii- price auto-
correlations decay [13, 15] (there is a loss of arbitrage
opportunity). In particular, the second stylised fact has
long-range implications on the dynamics of meta-orders,
and comprises the square-root impact law [16] (growth
in square-root of orders impact with traded volumes).
Implicit consequences of these stylised facts have fed nu-
merous discussions pertaining to the validity of market
memory [12, 15] and the extension of the efficient market
hypothesis [17, 18].
Epistemology : In the past, the epistemological perti-
nence of such models was sometimes put into question,
because of the general conceptual challenge of framing
realistic agents. Unlike other disciplines from hard sci-
ence, financial MAS indeed had to justify their proper
bottom-up approach to complex system inference [19]
in the light of a specific challenge of their field, namely
the difficulty to realistically model and emulate human
agents. Such critics especially carried greater weight by
the fact that previous generations of financial MAS re-
lied on so-called zero-intelligence agents [20]: these would
trade according to specific and imbedded rules of trading,
thereby overshadowing certain dynamics proper to game
and decision theory that are crucial to real market activ-
ity. Yet, if compared with other famous types of mod-
els used in quantitative finance, like econometrics [21],
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MAS have two major advantages: i- they naturally dis-
play specific emergent phenomena proper to complex sys-
tems [22], and ii- they require fewer model assumptions
(no gaussian distributions, no efficient market hypoth-
esis [17, 18], etc.). As for their shortcomings, we can
mention specific conceptual challenges pertaining to: i-
modelling complex system heterogeneity [23], ii- discre-
tionary framing of certain model parameters (e.g. num-
ber of agents) apart from possible empiricism [24].
Prospects: These general conceptual and epistemo-
logical considerations have been upset in the past few
years, by the notable progress of two fields. The first,
namely machine learning and especially multi-agent re-
inforcement learning [25] (RL), has produced spectacu-
lar results that have far-reaching applications to other
domains of interest to quantitative finance, like deci-
sion theory and game theory. The second, neuroscience
and neurofinance especially, has benefitted from the wide
use of brain-imaging devices [26] and peer data cura-
tion [27]. On both ends, some sort of technological emer-
gence within these two fields is of special interest and
relevance to financial MAS research, in that machine
learning can imbed results from the latter [28, 29], and
vice-versa [30, 31]. Among other machine learning ap-
plications to finance [32–34], and in a way similar to
what has been done for recent order book models [35–
37], next-generation MAS stock market simulators can
now be designed, and outstrip the former epistemological
considerations pertaining to agent design, with a whole
new degree of realism in market microstructure emula-
tion. More importantly, these can address issues never
computationally studied before, such as the crucial is-
sues of agent information and learning, central to price
formation [38, 39] and hence to all market activity.
Our study : We have designed such a MAS stock mar-
ket simulator, in which agents autonomously learn to
do price forecasting and stock trading by reinforcement
learning, via a centralised double-auction limit order
book, and shown in a previous work [40] its calibration
performances with respect to real market data from the
London Stock Exchange daily quotes between 2008 and
2018. We shall not review here its design in full details,
but will recall its general architecture in Section II. Then
our study will focus in Section III on agent learning: how
can we gauge how heterogenous are the agent policies as
compared to one another, and what are the trading char-
acteristics of successful agents. Finally in Section IV, we
will study the impact of such agent learning on the whole
market at the mesoscale, and in particular with respect
to herding or reflexivity effects when agents emulate the
investments of the best (or worst) agent, and when in-
creasing proportions of agents trade randomly as “noise
traders.” As said, the greatest interest of financial MAS
is to study and quantitatively gauge the impact of agent
learning, which is at the heart of the price formation
processes and hence of all market activity, and the mo-
tivation for multi-agent reinforcement learning for such
a framework is motivated by the important parallels be-
tween reinforcement learning and decision processes in
the brain [41].
II. MODEL
Architecture: We here briefly sketch the general ar-
chitecture of our MAS simulator. Our model relies on
a number I of economic agents autonomously trading
a number J of stocks, over a number T of simulation
time steps, where we set Ty = 286, Tm = 21, Tw = 5
as the number of annual trading days. All I agents
and their individual parameters are initialised at t = 0,
with a portfolio made of specific stock holdings of value
Aiequity(t) =
∑J
j=0Q
i,j(t)P j(t), where Qi,j(t) is the num-
ber of stocks j of agent i and P j(t) the market price
of stock j, together with risk-free assets (e.g. a bank
account) of value Aibonds(t). Then all market prices
are initialised at P j(t = 0) = £100, and as in other
models [42, 43], the simulation generates J time series
T j(t), which correspond to the fundamental values of
the stocks. These are not fully known by the I agents.
Instead, each agent i approximates the values T j(t) of
stock j according to a proprietary rule [44] of cointe-
gration κi,j [T j(t)] = Bi,j(t). The time series Bi,j(t) are
hence the approximation of the fundamental values of
stock j over time t according to agent i. Each agent thus
relies on these two sources of information for its stock
pricing strategy: one that is chartist, and one that is
fundamental. At t = 0, the agent are agnostic with re-
spect to trading. They are then allowed to learn over the
course of 1000 time steps, after which their stock hold-
ings and risk-free assets are reset back to their first value.
The simulation and following results are hence applied to
agents after this learning phase of 1000 time steps.
Initialisation: Let U() and U{} denote the continuous
and discrete uniform distributions, respectively. Each
agent is then initialised with the following parameters:
a drawdown limit li ∼ U(50%, 60%) (which is the maxi-
mum year-to-date loss in net asset value below which the
agent is set as bankrupt), a reflexivity parameter ρi ∼
U(0, 100%) (which gauges how fundamental or chartist
the agent is via a weighted average of its price forecast),
an investment horizon τ i ∼ U{Tw, 6Tm} (which is the
number of time steps after which the agent liquidates
its position), a trading window wi ∼ U{Tw, τ i} (which
assesses the optimal trading time for sending an order),
a memory interval hi ∼ U{Tw, T − τ i − 2Tw} (which is
the size of the past lag interval used by the agent for its
learning process), a transaction gesture gi ∼ U(0.2, 0.8)
(which scales with bid-ask spread to set how far above or
below the value of its own stock pricing the agent is will-
ing to deal the transaction), and a reinforcement learn-
ing rate α ∼ U(0.05, 0.20) proper to both reinforcement
learning algorithms F i and T i (see below).
Order book : At each time step, the agents may send
transaction orders to the order book of each stock, whose
function is to match these orders and process associated
business transactions. More specifically, a number J of
order books are filled with all the agents’ trading limit
orders for each stock j at time step t. All buy orders
are there sorted by descending bid prices, all sell orders
are sorted by ascending ask prices, each with their own
associated number of stocks to trade. Then the order
book clears these matching orders at same time step t,
with each transaction set at mid-price between buy and
sell-side, starting from the top of the order book to the
lowest level where the bid price still exceeds the ask price.
Importantly, we then define the market price P j(t + 1)
of stock j at the next time step t as that last and lowest
level mid-price cleared by the order book. We also define
the trading volume V j(t + 1) as the number of stocks
j traded during that same time t. We also model the
friction costs via broker fees [45] applied to each transac-
tion set at 0.1%, an annual risk-free rate of 1% applied
to Aibonds(t), and an annual stock dividend yield of 2%
according to [46] applied to Aiequity(t).
Agents: Each agent autonomously uses two distinct
reinforcement learning algorithms to interact with the
market. For a brief introductory sum up of reinforce-
ment learning, we refer the reader to [40], and to [47–49]
for a thorough study of the subject. A first algorithm F i
learns the optimal econometric prediction function for
the agent’s investment horizon, depending on specific lo-
cal characteristics of the market microstructure and the
agent’s fundamental valuation Bi,j(t). It thus outputs
this price forecast, which will in turn enter as input the
second reinforcement learning algorithm T i. This sec-
ond algorithm is in charge of sending an optimal limit
order to a double auction order book [50] at this same
time step, based on this prediction and a few other mar-
ket microstructure and agent portfolio indicators. Each
reinforcement learning algorithm is individually ran by
each agent i following a direct policy search, for each
stock j, and at each time step t. Each algorithm has
27 × 27 = 729 and 108 × 9 = 972 potential action-state
pairs, respectively. We define the sets of states S, actions
A, and returns R of these two algorithms according to
the following:
i- Forecasting : In the first algorithm F i, which is used
for price forecasting, the agent continuously monitors the
longer-term volatility of the stock prices sF0 = {0, 1, 2},
their shorter-term volatility sF1 = {0, 1, 2}, and the gap
between its own present fundamental valuation and the
present market price sF2 = {0, 1, 2}. This allows the
agent to retrieve useful information on the microstruc-
ture and topology of the volatility, while avoiding di-
mensionality issues. Out of this state, it learns to op-
timise its price prediction at its investment horizon τ i
by selecting from a direct policy search three possible
actions: choosing a simple forecasting econometric tool
based on mean-reverting, averaging, or trend-following
market prices aF0 = {0, 1, 2}, choosing the size of the his-
torical lag interval for this forecast aF1 = {0, 1, 2}, and
choosing the weight of its own fundamental stock pricing
in an overall future price estimation, that is both fun-
damentalist and chartist aF2 = {0, 1, 2}. This is done
in proportion to the agent reflexivity parameter ρi. Via
this action aF2 , the agent thus learns to gauge how fun-
damental or chartist it should be is in its price valuation,
via a weighted average involving ρi in the agent’s tech-
nical forecast of the market price Pˆ i,j(t) and its funda-
mental pricing Bi,j(t). At each time step, the rewards
rF = {−4,−2,−1, 1, 2, 4} are defined according to per-
centiles in the distribution of the agent’s mismatches be-
tween past forecasts at time t−τ i and their eventual price
realisation at time t. In parallel, an off-policy method
computes the optimal action that was to be performed
t− τ i time steps ago, now that the market price P j(t) is
realised, and updates the agent policy accordingly.
ii- Trading : In the second algorithm T i, which is
used for stock trading, the agent continuously moni-
tors whether the stock prices are increasing or decreas-
ing according to the output of the former algorithm
sT0 = {0, 1, 2}, their volatility sT1 = {0, 1, 2}, its risk-
free assets sT2 = {0, 1}, its quantity of stock holdings
sT3 = {0, 1}, and the traded volumes of stock j at for-
mer time step sT4 = {0, 1, 2}. Out of this state, it learns
to optimise its investments by selecting two possible ac-
tions via a direct policy search: sending a transaction
order to the order book as holding, buying, or selling a
position in a given amount proportional to its risk-free
assets and stock holdings aT0 = {0, 1, 2}, and at what
price wrt. the law of supply and demand aT1 = {0, 1, 2}.
The cashflow difference between the profit or loss con-
sequent to the agent’s action, and that without action
having been taken, are then computed τ i time steps after
each transaction. The rewards rT = {−4,−2,−1, 1, 2, 4}
are defined according to percentiles in the distribution
of these agent’s past cashflow differences. In parallel, an
off-policy method computes the optimal action that was
to be performed t− τ i time steps ago, now that the mar-
ket price P j(t) is realised, and updates the agent policy
according to it.
III. AGENT LEARNING
A. Agent policy heterogeneity
We first want to measure the heterogeneity of the indi-
vidual policies of these best and worse agents, not only as
compared to one another as groups, but also to all other
agents in the whole market population, and dynamically
as a function of time. For this we compute matrices DF
and DT of dimensions I × I, where each matrix element
dFm,n and d
T
m,n respectively, is computed as the average
of the absolute differences between the probabilities pim
and pin within the policy of agents im and in, for each
policy piF (s, a) and piT (s, a):
dm,n =
1
|S||A|
S∑
ks=1
A∑
ka=1
|pim(sks , aka)− pin(sks , aka)| (1)
FIG. 1: Policy distances as defined by equation 1 for the
first algorithm F() (continuous curves) and the second algo-
rithm T () (dashed curves), scaled to F() values to account
for different numbers of state-action pairs, as a function of
simulation time in years, expressing in percentage the hetero-
geneity between different groups of agents : best 10% agents
with themselves (blue), best 10% agents with all other agents
(red), best 10% agents with with worst 10% agents (yellow),
worst 10% agents with all other agents (green), and worst 10%
agents with themselves (brown). The simulations are gener-
ated with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875, S = 20.
The results are shown on Fig. 1, where the values
corresponding to T () were scaled to those correspond-
ing to F(), in order to account for the different numbers
of state-action pairs. For the first forecasting algorithm
F(), we see that the best performing agents together con-
verge to a pool of more diverse forecasting strategies, as
compared to one another, but also to the worst perform-
ing agents and the rest of all market agents. Interest-
ingly, the worst performing agents are less disparate in
their policies among themselves, even more so than with
regards to the rest of the market population. We see
similar dynamics with the trading algorithm T (), with
an even more pronounced heterogeneity among groups.
One can say that as simulation time passes, worst per-
forming agents have more in common among themselves,
than best performing agents among themselves. This is
a remarkable prediction under our model assumptions,
because of its implication to trading strategies: there are
more ways to succeed than to fail. From a regulation
point of view, this also potentially implies that financial
stock markets benefit in stability from the multitudes of
available trading instruments, structured products, and
a diversification of investment strategies. Finally, we also
note that the curves corresponding to the forecasting al-
gorithm F() are sorted like those of the trading algorithm
T (), and nearly overlap one another. We posit this to be
a consequence of the fact that each agent has identical
reinforcement learning parameters (learning rate, rolling
intervals, etc.) for both algorithms F() and T ().
B. Agent trading strategy
One of the first valuable statistical inference from the
simulation is to gauge the agent propensity to engage
in fundamentalist or chartist stock valuation for trad-
ing. At the mesoscale, this is one of the greatest known
source of bubble formation and other so-called reflexivity
effects [51]. Recall from Section II that each agent was
initialised with a reflexivity parameter ρi ∼ U(0, 100%),
reflecting how fundamental or chartist the agent is in
its asset valuation. This reflexivity parameter ρi works
with a weighted average between the agent’s technical
price forecast and its cointegrated estimation of the fun-
damental value of the stock. The agent learns to optimise
this parameter through action aF2 , and hence learns to be
more chartist or fundamentalist, depending on the mar-
ket dynamics, represented by its states sF0 (longer-term
volatility of the stock prices), sF1 (shorter-term volatil-
ity), and sF2 (gap between the agent’s own present funda-
mental valuation and present market price). We show the
results on Fig. 2, where we can see at the end t = T of the
simulation a trend for the 10% best agents to be funda-
mentalists and the 10% worse agents to be chartists. We
see that best performing agents have a tendency for being
more fundamentalist, while the worst performing agents
have for being more chartists. This can be linked with
assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis of [17], if
we would consider that all the information that is en-
dogenous to the market is retrieved by the agents (in the
sense that it is available to all), but that exogenous in-
formation would be less accessible, and hence a filter to
screen agent trading performance.
FIG. 2: Distribution of the reflexivity parameter ρi of the
10% best (blue curve) and 10% worse (red curve) agents, at
the end of the simulation set with parameters I = 500, J = 1,
T = 2875, S = 20.
Another minor trait of reflexivity at the agent level
is how much agents differ in their price estimation, and
hence in the bid-ask spread formation. We can have
a look into this spread and price formation process by
checking the propensity for best performing agents to
have a large gesture, as compared to worst performing
ones. Such study has many parallels with market making
and other strategies based on scalping the bid-ask spread.
Recall each agent was initialised with a transaction ges-
ture gi ∼ U(0.2, 0.8), reflecting how far above or below
its own asset pricing the agent is willing to trade. The
results are shown on Fig. 3, where we can see that best
performing agents have a propensity for having a smaller
transaction gesture (propensity to bid larger prices and
ask smaller prices in transaction orders), while worst per-
forming agents have a propensity for having a larger one
(propensity to bid smaller prices and ask larger prices in
transaction orders). Interestingly, such results indicate
that “tougher” negotiators would thus statistically not
be prone to better trading performance necessarily.
FIG. 3: Distribution of the gesture parameter gi of the 10%
best (blue curve) and 10% worse (red curve) agents, at the
end of the simulation set with parameters I = 500, J = 1,
T = 2875, S = 20.
IV. MARKET IMPACT
A. Agent learning rate
We then want to see the impact of the reinforcement
learning rate on agent performance and overall market
dynamics. Such study is related to the market impact
over the years of ever higher frequency and lower la-
tency strategies of trading. Recall each agent is ini-
tialised with a learning rate modelled by a parameter
β ∼ U(0.05, 0.20) for both reinforcement algorithms F i
and T i. In order to do this, we first vary the percentage
p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% of agents with such a learn-
ing rate multiplied by a scalar ζ = 2, so that it is statisti-
cally twice larger than that of the other agents.Then we
study the impact of the learning rate when it is scaled by
an increasing value of ζ = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5 for the en-
tire agent population. For both such variations in quan-
tity p and quality ζ of agent learning rates, we can ob-
serve the following:
– We see on Fig. 4 rather stable price volatilities at
different time-scales.
– We see on Fig. 5 a strong increase in the number
of market crashes.
– We see on Fig. 6 mildly increasing percentages of
agent bankruptcies.
It is thus interesting to note that both types of varia-
tions in agent learning rates in our model do not affect
general market volatility, except in tail events with statis-
tically much greater numbers of market crashes. Means
of agent bankruptcies are mildly affected.
FIG. 4: (a) Means of volatilities (defined as standard de-
viations of price normalised to price itself σ/P (t)) computed
over lags of one week (blue), one month (red), and six months
(yellow) intervals, for a percentage p of agents correspond-
ing to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% of the total agent pop-
ulation with a learning rate scaled by a factor ζ = 2 (the
remainder 100 − p being agents initialised with a learning
rate β ∼ U(0.05, 0.20)). (b) Means of volatilities (defined as
standard deviations of price normalised to price itself σ/P (t))
computed over lags of one week (blue), one month (red), and
six months (yellow) intervals, for simulations where the en-
tire agent population has a learning rate scaled with factor
ζ = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5. The simulations are generated with
parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875, S = 20.
B. Impact of best agent herding
The importance of reflexivity in the agent proprietary
price estimation and hence trading yield an open ques-
tion, namely as to what or who is the source of the reflex-
ivity trend endogenous to the market. A first natural and
logical answer to this would be renown investors, traders,
FIG. 5: (a) Number of market crashes (defined as a drop
of more than 20% in market price), for a percentage p of
agents corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% of the
total agent population with a learning rate scaled by a factor
ζ = 2 (the remainder 100 − p being agents initialised with
a learning rate β ∼ U(0.05, 0.20)). (b) Number of market
crashes for simulations where the entire agent population has
a learning rate scaled with factor ζ = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5. The
simulations are generated with parameters I = 500, J = 1,
T = 2875, S = 20.
analysts, etc. that often publish investment recommen-
dations or reviews. We thus can study the impact of
agent reflexivity or herding on the market as a whole, as
we introduce increasing percentages p of agents sending
(when possible) the same transaction order to the order
book at time t + 1 that was sent by the agent with best
trading performance or track record at time t. For the
sake of simplicity, we consider this agent with best trad-
ing performance as the one with largest net asset value
at time t. Therefore, the rest of the herding agents may
follow and emulate different agents over time (just as in
real markets). In particular, for larger percentages of
such best herding agents, we can mention the following:
– We see on Fig. 7 a strong increase in price volatili-
ties, especially for higher percentages. Notice that
this trend is almost imperceptible for p < 50.
– We see on Fig. 8 extremely decreasing trading vol-
umes.
– We see on Fig. 9 extremely increasing numbers of
FIG. 6: (a) Means of all percentage of bankrupt agents
at each time step t, for simulations with a percentage p of
agents corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% of the
total agent population with a learning rate scaled by a factor
ζ = 2 (the remainder 100 − p being agents initialised with a
learning rate β ∼ U(0.05, 0.20)). (b) Means of all percentage
of bankrupt agents at each time step t, for simulations where
the entire agent population has a learning rate scaled with
factor ζ = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5. The simulations are generated
with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875, S = 20.
market crashes.
– We see on Fig. 10 steadily decreasing market
bid-ask spreads, until p > 60%, after which they
slightly increase again.
– Remarkably, the rates of agent bankruptcy remain
stable regardless of these varying percentages, with
average means of 22.76± 3.25% for all values of p.
This may be counter-intuitive, but following a renown
investor according to this model is extremely averse to
market stability.
C. Impact of worst agent herding
We then want to study the impact of agent reflexivity
or herding on the whole market, as we introduce an in-
creasing percentage of agents sending (when possible) the
same transaction order to the order book at time t+1 that
FIG. 7: Distribution of logarithmic returns of prices
log[P (t)/P (t− 1)] of real (dashed black curve) and simulated
(continuous curves) data. The simulations are for a percent-
age p of agents corresponding to p = 0% (red), p = 20%
(yellow), p = 40% (green), p = 60% (brown), and p = 80%
(light blue) of the total agent population at time t following
the best agent (a), following the worst agent (b), or trading
randomly (c), while the remainder 100−p engaging in propri-
etary trading strategies. The simulations are generated with
parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875, S = 20.
was sent by the agent with worst trading performance at
time t. The interest of this is to study how asymmetric
market dynamics become to best agent herding. Here we
consider this agent with worst trading performance as the
one with lowest, non-bankrupt, net asset value at time
t. Therefore, the rest of the herding agents may follow
and emulate different agents over time. In particular, for
larger percentages of such worst herding agents, we can
FIG. 8: Means of all trading volumes, for a percentage p
of agents corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% of
the total agent population at time t following the best agent
(blue), following the worst agent (red), or trading randomly
(grey), while the remainder 100 − p engaging in proprietary
trading strategies. The simulations are generated with pa-
rameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875, S = 20.
FIG. 9: Means of market crashes (defined as a drop of more
than 20% in market price), for a percentage p of agents cor-
responding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% of the total agent
population at time t following the best agent (blue), follow-
ing the worst agent (red), or trading randomly (grey), while
the remainder 100− p engaging in proprietary trading strate-
gies. The simulations are generated with parameters I = 500,
J = 1, T = 2875, S = 20.
mention the following:
– We see on Fig. 7 a very strong increase in price
volatilities, especially for higher percentages. No-
tice that this trend is almost imperceptible for
p < 50.
– We see on Fig. 8 a very strong decrease in trading
volumes.
– We see on Fig. 9 an extreme increase in market
crashes, especially for higher percentages.
– We see on Fig. 10 steadily decreasing bid-ask
spreads, except for a strong surge for higher per-
centages p > 80%.
FIG. 10: Means of bid-ask spread in percentages of the
price, for a percentage p of agents corresponding to p =
0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% of the total agent population at time
t following the best agent (blue), following the worst agent
(red), or trading randomly (grey), while the remainder 100−p
engaging in proprietary trading strategies. The simulations
are generated with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875,
S = 20.
– As one could expect, the rates of agent bankruptcy
greatly increase with these varying percentages,
staying above 70% of agent bankruptcy for p >
20%.
We conclude that market instability explodes with in-
creasing proportions of such somewhat unrealistic agents,
since no real investor will try and emulate the worst
agent. Nevertheless, this shows and validate the pre-
vious observations with increasing percentages of agents
following the best investor at time t.
D. Impact of noise traders
We then want to study the whole impact of agent
learning on the market as we introduce an increasing
percentage of “noise traders”, i. e. agents trading ran-
domly [52]. A priori, an ever increasing number of noise
agents should bring a certain financial stability to the
whole market, by providing more liquidity and higher
trading volumes in both bid and offer. In particular, for
larger percentages of such “noise” agents, we can observe
the following:
– We see on Fig. 7 a very strong decrease in price
volatilities, as seen from price returns distributions,
and as we see on Fig. 11, a general decrease in
volatilities at all time scales.
– We see on Fig. 8 a very strong increase in trading
volumes.
– We see on Fig. 9 a very sharp decrease in market
crashes, which virtually almost vanish for p > 50%.
– We see on Fig. 10 a slow and steady increase in
bid-ask spreads.
– We see on Fig. 12 a steady increase in length of
both bull and bear market regimes, especially the
former.
– Bankruptcy rates steadily decrease with such
higher proportion of noise traders from means of
23.22% for p = 0%, to 18.84% for p = 80%. This
is remarkable, as one could have posited that agent
survival rates would decrease because of such ran-
dom trading.
We conclude that counter-intuitively, larger numbers of
agents trading randomly is beneficial to market stability
and performance.
FIG. 11: Means of volatilities (defined as standard devia-
tions of price normalised to price itself σ/P (t)) computed over
lags of one week (green), one month (red), and six months
(blue) intervals, for a percentage p of agents corresponding
to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% of the total agent population
trading randomly (the remainder 100− p engaging in propri-
etary trading strategies). The simulations are generated with
parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875, S = 20.
V. CONCLUSION
Following calibration performances shown in a previ-
ous work [40], we have used a multi-agent reinforcement
learning system to model stock market price microstruc-
ture. The advantage of such a framework is that it al-
lows to gauge and quantify agent learning, which is at
the source of the price formation process, itself at the
foundation of all market activity. We first studied agent
learning, and then its mesoscale impact on market sta-
bility and agent performance.
According to our results on policy learning, we posit
that there are more trading strategies that yield success-
ful portfolio performance, than unsuccessful.
We also found that best performing agents have
a propensity for being fundamentalists rather than
chartists in their approach to asset price valuation, and
to be less stringent in their choices of transaction orders
(i. e. willing to transact orders with larger bids or lower
asks).
FIG. 12: Distribution of the number of consecutive days of
rising prices (positive values) and dropping prices (negative
values). This is for both real (dashed black curve) and simu-
lated (continuous curves) data, the latter being for a percent-
age p of agents corresponding to p = 0% (red), p = 20% (yel-
low), p = 40% (green), p = 60% (brown), and p = 80% (light
blue) of the total agent population trading randomly (the re-
mainder 100 − p engaging in proprietary trading strategies).
The simulations are generated with parameters I = 500,
J = 1, T = 2875, S = 20.
Next, we studied the impact on the market of agent
learning rates, and found that market volatilities at all
time-scales did not vary much (with more agents with
larger learning rates, or when all agent collectively have
larger learning rates), except for tail events, with average
numbers of crashes greatly increasing. We also found
that agent bankruptcy rates were not much impacted by
such variations in reinforcement learning rates.
Then we studied the effect of herding or reflexivity,
when increasing percentages of agents follow and emulate
the investments of the best (and worst) performing agent
at each simulation time step. As expected, we found that
both such behaviours greatly increase market instability.
Yet remarkably, bankruptcy rates of simulations with a
best agent herding set up remain quite stable, regardless
of the percentages of such agents, and regardless of the
yet strongly increasing market volatilities and numbers
of crashes.
Finally, we sought to explore the impact of agent trad-
ing information on the price formation process, with
larger proportions of “noise traders” (i. e. agents trad-
ing randomly), and found a much greater market stability
with increasing percentages of such agents, with a num-
ber of crashes virtually vanishing. We also found such
markets to be more prone to display bull regimes, and
that agents bankruptcy rates slightly diminished.
We trust such predictions under our model assump-
tions would be of interest not only to academia, but to
industry practitioners and market regulators alike. A
natural extension of our model would be to endow agents
with a short selling ability (in order to account for specific
microstructure effects in times of bubbles for instance).
One could also add to each agent to capacity to perform
proper portfolio diversification in the model’s multivari-
ate framework. Finally, we graciously acknowledge this
work was supported by the RFFI grant nr. 16-51-150007
and CNRS PRC nr. 151199.
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